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The Shortcomings of the Philosopher President: Sun Yat-sen’s Provisional Presidency of 1912
As the twentieth century began, the Qing dynasty found itself besieged by foreign
powers. Critically examining these powers, such as the United States and Great Britain, Chinese
thinkers found themselves in a paradox regarding the country’s future. On one hand, China could
adhere to Confucian tradition, rebuke Western ideals, and maintain its distinct culture. On the
other, these foreign nations had swept into China, pillaged its treasuries, and slaughtered its
armies. These nations clearly had great power, which some argued stemmed from their
modernization and political structure. To modernize, these would-be revolutionaries thought that
the country should adopt Western principles. In 1905, one of these revolutionaries, an idealist
named Sun Yat-sen, proposed his “Three People’s Principles,” namely “nationalism, democracy,
and the people’s livelihood,” to bring China into the modern age. In the coming years, he sought
to make these ideals a reality, and for a brief time, he had an opportunity to do so.
After the 1911 Revolution, Sun served as the provisional president of the new Republic
for three months. Although his tenure as provisional president was short, it could not have come
at a more crucial moment— an interim between the end of a dynastic tradition and hopefully the
beginning of a republican one. Soon after becoming president, however, he turned power over to
Yuan Shukai, a powerful military leader. Sun's provisional presidency is often perceived as a
brief, symbolic administration devoid of practical implications, and Sun is generally seen as an
idle figurehead rather than a real leader with influence and autonomy during this time. This
narrative, however, fails to capture both the nuance of the situation and the complexity of Sun as
an individual. Undoubtedly, Sun’s authority and reputation amongst fellow revolutionaries led to
his election. During the provisional presidency, Sun tried to lay the groundwork for a modern
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constitutional republic centered around the “Three People’s Principles,” but failed due to the
broader political uncertainty brought by Yuan’s presence. When Yuan took power, Sun initially
supported his administration, but soon he became frustrated with Yuan’s increasingly autocratic
decisions. Sun’s political involvement, then, did not cease with the end of his presidential term;
instead, he was politically active and even belligerently idealistic until Yuan forced him into
exile in 1913.
When Sun first published his “Three People’s Principles,” he offered a bold new
blueprint for the future of China. In a 1906 speech in Tokyo, Sun articulated that the three
principles of nationalism, democracy, and “the people’s livelihood” were to guide China into the
modern age, along with a constitution to serve as the republic’s foundational legal document.
First, he argued that ethnic nationalism should inspire a revolution, appealing to the Han
population. He said, “Once we Han unite, our power will be thousands of times greater than
theirs, and the success of the nationalist revolution will be assured.” 1 In a biography of Sun,
Marie-Claire Bergere clarifies that this nationalism was not directed against Western powers, but
rather the Manchu, who Sun saw as the true oppressors of the people. Second, Sun argued that a
democratic revolution must occur simultaneously with nationalist fervor. He wrote, “We must
carry out a popular revolution that will lead to the creation of a government of the people.” 2
Explaining this choice, Bergere comments that Sun thought a republic was the most modern and
therefore the most effective form of governance. 3 Third, Sun emphasized the importance of the
“People’s Livelihood,” or socialism. He recognized growing wealth inequality and sought to
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remedy the plight of the poor through land redistribution.4 Finally, he explicated the importance
of a “five-power” constitution; it would include a separation of powers, civil service
examinations, anti-corruption measures, and both a legislative and executive branch. 5 Heavily
influenced by American and British constitutions, Sun saw value and power in the nations who
had dominated China.
With these ideas in mind, Sun rose to take power as the Qing dynasty became weaker and
weaker. Interestingly enough, however, he was not in China as the anti-Manchu revolution began
in October of 1911. Sun’s own Revolutionary Alliance had failed to overthrow the Manchu
almost six months earlier, and he was abroad gathering funds that October. Instead, the
insurrection that sparked the demise of the Qing occurred in the city of Wuchang, and it was
incited by accident. On October 9, a bomb exploded in a revolutionary warehouse, drawing
unneeded attention and causing government officials to storm the location and seize some
insurgents. Other revolutionaries responded with violence, and enough dissatisfied Qing soldiers
took their side that a temporary military government overpowered the Manchu officials in the
city.6 This new government declared provincial independence from the Manchu capital in
Peking, though it lacked any leadership structure. Initially, it was quite hectic, described as a
“headless dragon,” but soon, Song Jiaoren and Huang Xing, two influential revolutionary
figures, took hold of the situation.7 News of the Wuchang Uprising diffused throughout the
country, and revolution quickly gripped China.
As initial reports from Wuchang came to him, Sun was in Denver, Colorado. There, he
was raising funds for revolutionary activities, and one day in October, he received a telegram
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from Huang stating that the revolution had begun. Instead of immediately rushing back to China,
however, he bought plane tickets to New York and London. Explaining this decision in his
Autobiography, he wrote, “In twenty days I could land in Shanghai and take part in the
revolutionary struggle, but at that point the diplomatic front was more important to us than the
firing line. I therefore resolved to address myself to matters of a diplomatic order.” 8 Though
prescient in thought, this mission in practice did not prove diplomatically fruitful. In New York
and London, he failed to reach agreements with any leaders. Though he asserted his legitimacy,
writing in a memorandum that “there can be no doubt” he would serve as president, foreign
leaders did not believe him due to the instability of the country. Refusing to support Sun, one
English minister noted that “it was Yuan Shikai who seemed to be the man of the moment.” 9
This observation would become prophetic in the years to come. Though Sun’s foreign mission
was a complete failure for establishing strong ties between foreign nations and the new republic,
it still turned out to be quite self-serving in his own political career. Bergere writes that “the
rumor of his contacts with Western leaders and other figures of importance bestowed an aura of
prestige upon him.”10 Once he returned to China, he held a certain sway that other
revolutionaries did not.
As Sun travelled across the United States and Europe, revolution spread across China like
wildfire. Less than two months after revolution had broken out, fifteen of the eighteen essential
Chinese provinces had declared independence from Peking. To try to salvage the situation, the
Manchu Court brought Yuan Shikai out of retirement, since he was “the only man who seemed
capable of leading the imperial armies against the revolutionaries.” 11 The Manchu had trusted
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Yuan previously, since he assisted in many efforts to salvage the Qing dynasty. During this final
effort, he led an army to fight the rebels, but the result differed from expectations. Due to
Western intervention, war turned into negotiations, and by mid-December, the fighting had
ceased entirely. The northern provinces, held by the Qing, were represented by Yuan, and the
southern provinces, held by the provisional government, were represented by several
revolutionary factions. In these negotiations, Yuan took authority over the Manchu court in
Beijing, offered to have the emperor resign, and put himself in a position to lead the people once
the new government had been established. 12 In the meantime, however, he would remain on the
sidelines.
Sun finally returned to China on December 21, 1911. Soon after, the provisional
government based in Nanking held its elections for president. On December 29, Sun was elected
the Provisional President of the Republic of China by parliament, winning the election 16-1, with
each independent province allotted one vote. Sun won because he had been abroad, while much
infighting took place, leaving his reputation unscathed by the factionalism that riddled the
provisional government. In a statement published on December 30, he offered his hopes for the
government. He called for unity within both the Tongmenghui, his revolutionary party, and the
new provisional government. He wrote: “We need to be closely united among ourselves, forming
a solid and invincible group. When our forces are amassed in strength, many more will be
attracted to join us. ‘A tree with dense foliage is an invitation to many birds.’” 13 This message of
unity was inspired by the factionalism within the revolutionary groups. Along with Sun and the
Tongmenghui, Song Jiaoren and Huang Xing also held great influence, and they had different
views than Sun about the new republic’s direction. Nevertheless, to succeed, Sun argued that the
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provisional government needed to band together. Appealing to his central philosophy, Sun
connected his lofty ideals to a practical mission for governance. He wrote:
In the three great principles that our party proclaims… there is a sequence in their
implementation, but we will not be able to create a perfect, unified nation and support our
critical purpose unless all three of these principles are implemented fully, without
exception. It goes without saying, therefore, that our party’s responsibility does not end
with accomplishing the principles of nationalism, but, rather, with securing the people’s
rights and the people’s livelihoods.14
As the Manchu had lost power, the principle of nationalism had been established for Sun. This,
however, did not mean the revolution was over. Instead, much work remained— democracy was
not yet secure, and neither was the “People’s Livelihood.” The party and the government needed
to take swift and decisive action to make these ideals a reality.
Sun took office as the provisional president on January 1, 1912. His first act as president
was “to lead a procession bearing sacrificial tribute to the tombs of the Ming emperors at
Nanking,” ultimately fulfilling the overthrow of the Manchus. 15 That same day, he wrote a
message to Yuan Shikai emphasizing the temporary nature of his presidency. Sun wrote,
“Although I have accepted this position, for the time being, it is actually waiting for you…I hope
that you will soon decide to accept this offer.” 16 This decision may seem surprising, but to Sun, it
was only natural. In a 1918 memoir, reflecting back on the decision, he wrote, “I renounced the
Presidency, not for fear of the power of Yuan Shikai, but because I could not carry out the tasks
of revolutionary reconstruction.”17 By this, he meant his position and power were undefined and
tentative. In the meantime, Sun assembled a cabinet of China’s top officials to begin building up
the republic. Aside from this, his only notable accomplishments during January were “the
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adoption of the solar calendar, and the replacement of the imperial dragons by a flag with five
horizontal colored stripes: red, yellow, blue, black, and white.” 18 He sought to efface any
remnants of Qing influence from the new provisional government.
Though many knew Sun would not be a permanent president, it seems the exact length of
his term remained unknown until February 12, 1912. On that day, Yuan Shikai and the Qing
government issued an edict claiming that the emperor Puyi would abdicate his throne
immediately. On the edict, an official logo sits between pictures of “President Sun Yat-sen” and
“Premier Yuan Shikai,” with the Empress Dowager and the Emperor Puyi pictured atop the
page.19 With this positioning, the edict clearly wanted to demonstrate unity and coherence
throughout the transition. (See final page for full image). On February 15, in the provisional
capital of Nanking, Sun announced his resignation from the presidency forty-five days after
taking power. Soon Yuan would hold the office of president, and the Republic would officially
be established. Nevertheless, this change was not immediate. Bergere explains:
[Sun] appended to his resignation a number of conditions: Nanking was to remain the
capital, and after his election the president was to come there to take up his functions.
Only then would Sun’s resignation take effect. In the meantime, Parliament was to
promulgate the Constitution of the provisional government to which the new president
would have to swear loyalty.20
Sun sought to check Yuan’s ambition with these two conditions. In time, Yuan would overcome
both, but the fact that Sun’s resignation was conditional demonstrates that he did not roll over
and immediately submit to Yuan. The battle over the capital city’s location was tenuous.
Parliament resided in Nanking and wanted to stay there, and Peking served as the home of the
old, detestable Qing court. Nevertheless, Yuan wanted to reside there, and he ultimately
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prevailed. On the same day Sun’s delegation arrived to negotiate, Yuan squashed a riot in the
city, demonstrating that the president needed to reside in Peking to hold order. 21 The new center
of government would eventually move to Peking, much to the disappointment of Sun and other
revolutionaries suspicious of Yuan.
As Sun fought to ensure that the president resided in Nanking, the legislature built a
constitution in hopes of limiting Yuan’s power. On March 12, the official document was ratified
and published. With fifty-six different articles delineating the rights of the people and the powers
of the government, the document resembled a mixture of the American and British constitutions.
Written with suspicion of Yuan practically built into the document, the constitution named its
legislature the “Advisory Council” and gave it the ability to check the president. In Article 33,
the Constitution stated: “The Provisional President shall ordain and establish the administrative
system and official regulations, but he must first submit them to the Advisory Council for its
approval.”22 Likewise, in Article 34, it stated the Provisional President “shall appoint and remove
civil and military officers, but in the appointment of members of the cabinet, ambassadors and
ministers, he must have concurrence of the Advisory Council.” 23 Drawing almost directly from
American constitutional tradition, the provisional legislature sought to limit the powers of the
executive, particularly the ambitious Yuan.
Yuan took power on April 1, and afterwards Sun initially believed that achieving
democracy, the second People’s Principle, was quite possible despite his previous concerns.
Perhaps this came from the stronger constitution passed by the national legislature, or perhaps it
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came from the growth in democratic experiments throughout the country. In an article discussing
these experiments, Wang Chaoguang notes that:
There were a total of 312 parties at that time, 82 and 80 of which were based in Beijing
and Shanghai respectively. According to one study, ‘almost all Western-style parties
could be found in China’. Some had the ‘characteristics of being a political party, some
were pressure groups formed for a certain purpose and the remaining were alliances of
social activists.’24
With such a wide array of opinions, democracy was primed to flourish in parliament. The
majority, revolutionary party called the Kuomingtang (KMT) formed in the legislature and was
led by Song Jiaoren.25 Though they often opposed Yuan, he initially did little to limit their power
and influence. After the landslide victory at the beginning of 1913, however, that began to
change.
Many narratives argue that during this time, Sun retired from political life. 26 While he
removed himself from the public eye, he did not stop fighting for his ideas. In the months
following his abdication, Sun had continually met with Yuan to develop a plan for building the
government.27 Meanwhile, he took part in KMT activities, including speeches, debates, and
conventions. Sun diverted his efforts to the third principle, “the People’s Livelihood,” and to
accomplish this, Yuan appointed him the Director of Railways in September of 1912. Sun gave a
lecture given on September 14, 1912, entitled “Building Railroads across the Nation Is a Matter
of Life and Death for the Republic of China.”28 In the lecture, he argued that building railroads
and other infrastructure was necessary to create an economy fair to all. Proposing to build over
200,000 miles of railroads, he sought to have them funded publicly but owned privately— but
24
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after forty years, “the railroads will revert to state ownership.” 29 While well-thought out and
practical, the projects were never finished due to impending political turmoil.
As Sun sought to build up infrastructure, Yuan began tearing down the republic he
ostensibly swore to protect. His decision-making began to disregard the constitution entirely as
he sought to consolidate power unto himself. Most importantly, he ordered the assassination of
Song Jiaoren soon after Song’s election as prime minister. He was assassinated in a train station
on March 19, 1913. With his death, the Republic began to crumble. In April, Yuan
unconstitutionally began signing treaties and taking out loans without approval from the
Advisory Council. These loans allowed him to build up a strong military to crush any potential
insurrections. In June, he removed KMT governors in three provinces: Jiangxi, Guangdong and
Anhui.30 When Sun found out about Song’s death, he was in Japan fundraising for his railroad
project. Bergere writes that this moment “jolted Sun out of the political passivity into which he
had withdrawn the previous spring.”31 While “political passivity” mischaracterizes his actions,
Bergere’s observation that Sun was “jolted” into action is fair. His second return to China in the
midst of revolution would not be nearly as glorious as the first, two years prior.
After Song’s assassination, Sun became a vocal proponent of opposition against Yuan,
and the KMT agreed and began to organize against him politically. Sun, however, wanted active,
military rebellion, despite other rebels like Huang Xing’s more passive political strategy.
Nevertheless, after the removal of the three governors in June, Sun’s opinion prevailed. Wang
observes, “On Sun Yat-sen’s insistence, and after thorough consultation among the
revolutionaries, a consensus to take military action against Yuan was ultimately reached.” 32 The
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so-called “Second Revolution” began in July of 1912, with Sun Yat-sen as its figurehead.
Nevertheless, its actual battles lasted a mere month. Residing with large armies in the north,
Yuan simply held more power in a more strategic position. Additionally, he framed these
dissenters as rebels against the republican cause who threatened to preserve the peace. The KMT
was quickly exterminated, and its leaders evacuated to Japan. Bergere articulates the drama and
tragedy of the situation:
By early September, Yuan Shikai had crushed all the rebellions. He crowned his victory
by getting Parliament to elect him president for five years and inaugurated his mandate
with a dazzling ceremony on October 10, 1913, the second anniversary of the 1911
Revolution. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic, was now nothing but an exile. 33
The mission Sun had set out to accomplish two years ago had now failed entirely. Yuan
continued to bring China away from republican ideals and towards authoritarianism, and without
much money, an army, or many allies, all Sun could do was watch.
Writing a memoir in 1918, three years after Yuan’s death, Sun offered his insight into
why his presidency failed to transform the government into a strong republic. In part, he laid
blame on his colleagues, writing, “My ideas were too lofty for the comprehension of my
comrades, whose level of political intelligence was too low for that time, and I involuntarily
suffered through this.”34 He also recognized how his position limited the achievement of his
ideals. Sun noted, “Even if I had continued to be President—it would have been impossible to
realise the aims of the Revolution. The result would have been only that the new officials would
replace the old, which could scarcely bring China anything new in the sense of a reform of the
government or the strengthening of her economic power.” 35 Sun’s self-righteous tone here— one
of both superiority and infallibility— makes it somewhat difficult to sympathize with his
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shortcomings, but the context of the piece matters. Sun wrote this to explain why the revolution
had failed, but at this point in his life, he hoped to lead another one soon. As a result, he needed
to demonstrate both ideals of civic virtue and practical abilities to lead. He argued that because
of the nature of his position, rather than the nature of his abilities, he could not fulfill the
revolution.
Scholars disagree about why this initial experiment in republican democracy failed and
Yuan’s autocratic regime took hold. Wang points to the difference in mindset between Sun and
Yuan: “While Sun was full of ideals and ready to make compromises with his opponents
repeatedly, Yuan, a former leading imperial official whose thought and life-style were firmly
rooted in the old ways, was very ruthless and believed in using military powers against the
revolutionaries.”36 Like Wang, Bergere attributes the failure primarily to Sun, writing “The
presidency could not, in a month and a half, and lacking the means as well as the time, achieve
very much. It would have taken a firmer and more enlightened leadership than Sun Yat-sen’s to
make the most of the opportunity.”37 Regarding the inability to stop Yuan once he had seized
power, Mossley lays blame on the KMT. “There was neither money nor popular support for the
cause,” he observes, “and their military forces were quickly overrun.” 38 Though perspective
regarding blame differs, all consider this first attempt at a republic to be a complete disaster.
Sun continued to be an important figure in Chinese republican statecraft until his death in
1925. His position in history, however, stems from his writings about the “Three People’s
Principles” and his place as the founder of the Republic. Sun maintains a complex legacy today.
To some, Sun was an honorable individual who held great power, but for the sake of the state,
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passed it on—a paragon of civic virtue whose actions parallel great founders like Cincinnatus
and Washington. To others, he was a figure too caught up with his ideals to see the practical
political turmoil developing around him and stop it. Per usual, the truth lies somewhere in the
middle. Sun undoubtedly held great power and honorably relinquished it, but in the meantime, he
failed to utilize such power to build the nation. In part, this was because of his temperament—
extremely, even hopelessly, idealistic, while at the same time conciliatory towards foes.
Nevertheless, the tension inherent in his position is the true culprit to blame. Had Sun held onto
power himself and fought Yuan, he ran the risk of delegitimizing the republic and plunging the
nation into further turmoil. Instead, he hoped to bring order and stability through his presidency.
Whether or not Sun’s decisions were the right ones is impossible to determine. Nevertheless, we
see the consequences of his decisions reverberate throughout history: the ensuing Warlord era,
the eventual creation of Taiwan, and the complicated legacy he holds today.
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